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At the start of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. He promised an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast exemplifies the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—even as this squares with the new aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, noting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This pivot is consequential, but observers warn it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is complicated by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Apathy and Tensions

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Engagement and Conditional Involvement

A similar tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Some analysts see the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.